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I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered
into force on January 1, 1994.' Since then, the new General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been approved; control of the United
States Congress has changed from Democrat to Republican; Mexico is
going through a financial crisis; and apparently nothing dramatic, for
better or for worse, has yet happened to the American economy.
In practice, the viability of NAFTA was resolved on November
17, 1993, when the United States House of Representatives voted to pass
the bill of implementation and approval of the international accord.2 After
weeks of intense political debate, the House approved the agreement by a
vote of 234 to 200.' The margin did not fully reflect the degree of
uncertainty before the vote: such a wide margin was considered
* Alejandro Posadas is a fellow law lecturer at Duke University School of Law; J.D., UNAM,
Mexico 1992; LL.M. Duke, 1995. He is a founding member of the Mexican International Law
Students Association (AMEDI), of which he served as the first national President in 1991.
1. According to its Article 2203, the accord would enter into force "on an exchange of written
notifications certifying the completion of necessary legal procedures," which were completed on
December 30, 1992. North American Free Trade Agreement, 39 Free Trade L. Rep. (CCH) (Dec. 17,
1992).
2. H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
3. 139 CONG. REc. H10,048 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
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unattainable just a week before.4 The Senate approved the agreement,
three days later, by a comfortable margin.'
This paper is a study of the United States Congress in action, using
the passage of NAFTA as an example of the process. Chance did not
dictate the choice of NAFTA as the basis of the study. NAFTA is the first
serious effort to liberalize the exchange of goods and services, and to
adopt transnational rules and principles on aspects ranging from investment
and intellectual property to environment and labor, among countries that
have unequal economic capacity, diverse legal systems, and different
historical and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, Canada, the United States,
and Mexico, these "distant neighbors," share borders thousands of miles
long.
NAFTA probably had one chance in Congress. This article
questions how and why the controversial legislation was approved by the
bicameral representative body. In doing so, it raises typical issues
Congress faced in its decision-making process. The article focuses on the
House of Representatives when the international trade agreement was on
the verge of failing.
II. STATING THE ISSUE
A. One Long Day
If Representative Robert Dornan, a Republican from California ate
a late dinner that night, we might never know. It was to be his fate to
vote yes on bill HR 3450 that implemented NAFTA. Apparently, his wife
did not share his position and would probably have gone against the bill if
she had been voting instead of her husband. On the floor, someone even
regretted the representative's wife was unable to take his place.6
This split of opinion was mirrored across the United States during
the months preceding the approval. The polls reflected similar percentages
of people in favor of NAFTA, against NAFTA, and undecided.7 The
percentages were similar in the House of Representatives, and according to
Representative Dornan, probably in his house as well. Other houses were
4. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, XLIX CONG. Q. ALMANAC 171 (1993).
5. The final vote was 61 "ayes" and 38 "nays." 139 CONG. REC. S16,712 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1993).
6. "Mr. Chairman, no late dinner for me tonight. My wife is against NAFFA. But I have
the vote. I rise in support of NAFTA." 139 CONG. REC. H10,037 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993)
(statement of Representative Doman (R-CA)). Another member retorted, "Mr. Chairman, I
made a suggestion to the gentleman from California that his wife take his place . I." d. at
H10,039 (statement of Representative Gerald Solomon, R-NY).
7. See Public Support for NAFTA chart infra p. 447.
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also divided: Democratic representatives in the House and their own
leadership.
On November 17, the House was to decide the future of an
agreement mainly negotiated by a Republican President, but adopted and
presented to Congress by a Democratic President. The agreement had
been fiercely attacked by a strange coalition composed of organized labor,
environmentalists, the radical right, the protectionist left, and some very
specific powerful business groups, such as big sugar firms, citrus growers,
and the flat-glass industry.8 This coalition was especially favored by the
money and participation of former presidential candidate Ross Perot. On
the other hand, NAFTA arrived in the House in the wake of a string of
congressional approvals of trade liberalizing agreements stretching to the
end of World War II.' In addition, Presidents Carter, Ford, and Bush
responded to Clinton's request for support.'0 Corporate America and
almost all of the state governors were also pro-NAFTA allies."
The media had a significant role in the process by covering the
NAFTA debate extensively. 2 The academic world also participated
actively, producing a large body of literature on the subject, and
organizing symposiums and conferences all over the nation. 3 One of the
high points of the public dialogue was the November 9, 1993, televised
debate between Vice-President Al Gore and Ross Perot. " Unlike the Free
8. NAFTA: The Showdown, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 23 (discussing how torn
between populism and sound economics, Congress prepares to vote on NAFTA); Viva NAFTA,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 21 (choosing sides in treaty ratification).
9. According to I. M. Dextler from the University of Maryland, Congress has not
rejected a trade liberalization proposal in the postwar era. David S. Cloud, Decisive Vote Brings
Down Trade Walls with Mexico, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3014, 3175 (1993). See also Waking
up to NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1993, at 28 (gathering support for treaty for fight in
Congress).
10. Clinton invited the ex-Presidents to the September 14, 1993, signing of the NAFTA
side agreements. Their presence was intended to signal NAFTA represented a bipartisan and
national interest issue. Waking up to NAFTA, supra note 9, at 27.
11. See Businessmen for NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 27. In the last week of
August, all but nine governors supported the adoption of NAFTA. Viva NAFTA, supra note 8, at
22.
12. On November 21, 1993, 91% of respondents to a poll conducted by Gallup had, at
least to a small degree, followed the news about NAFTA; 24% responded they had followed it
very closely; 44%, somewhat closely; and 23%, not too closely. Only nine percent responded
that they had not followed the news at all or refused to answer. Westlaw Database, POLL,
NAFTA (Nov. 19-21, 1993).
13. See Jeffrey R. Jaffe, A Guide to the NAFTA Literature, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 197
(1994).
14. The debate was held during the CNN Larry King Show. Polls done before and after
the debate showed support for NAFTA rose from 34% to 57%. David S. Cloud, As NAFTA
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Trade Agreement with Canada, passed by Congress only five years earlier
by a very comfortable margin, the NAFTA process aroused controversy.' 5
"Not since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act has trade legislation produced
such bitter polarization of opinions." 6  Each side predicted dire
consequences if NAFTA did pass or if it did not pass. One long day in
November, the House debated for more than eleven hours before voting on
the bill. The debate had been framed months ago, but the result was
unknown until that long day ended.' 7
B. The Debate
The two most controversial issues in the NAFTA debate involved
the environment and labor; their lobbyists were the most active NAFTA
opponents. At the end, however, the fight was fought mainly by the AFL-
CIO. Since the Bush presidency, some environmental groups, including
the World Wide Fund for Nature, decided to support the agreement,
reasoning that it would be easier to monitor abuses in Mexico with an
agreement than without it. Other groups followed suit and supported the
agreement. '8
The environmental opponents mainly contended that the lower
enforcement levels in Mexico would attract American industry, adding
Countdown Begins, Wheeling Dealing Intensifies, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3104, 3106 (1993).
Another poll showed 52% of respondents did not change their opinion after the debate, but 35%
were more likely to support the agreement, versus 12% who were less likely to support it.
Westlaw, supra note 12.
15. The United States Senate passed S. 5090, implementing the Free Trade Agreement
between Canada and the United States, on September 19, 1988, by a vote of 83 to 9. By a vote
of 366 to 40, the House of Representatives passed it on August 9, 1988. Westlaw, Database CR-
ABS.
16. Paul Krugman, The NAFTA Debate-The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA: Its
Foreign Policy, Stupid, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 13.
17. The debate started at 11:11 a.m. and finished at 10:36 p.m. when the vote was
recorded. 139 CONG. REC. H10,078 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
18. Environmentalists were easier to convince through the creation of domestic incentives
and funds to promote infrastructure and environmental clean-up. The division, along with the
fact that presently all environmental groups are experiencing a decline in membership and a rise
in financial problems, weakened their fight against NAFTA. Organizations mentioned as backing
the ratification of the agreement were the National Audubon Society, the World Wildlife Fund,
the National Wildlife Foundation, the National Resources Defense Council, and the
Environmental Defense Fund. The main environmental groups opposing NAFTA were the Sierra
Club and the Friends of the Earth (some charters of the Auduborn Society and Greenpeace played
a less relevant role). Land of the Free-For-All, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'Y, Nov. 19, 1993, at
38; 139 CONG. REC. H9887, H9901 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993); see also Viva NAFTA, supra note
8, at 21.
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incentives to damage the already deteriorating Mexican environment.' 9
They pushed for reprisals against Mexico, rather than cooperation.
Framed in this manner, the environmental issue was closely related to the
labor issue. Labor groups also feared that industries were attracted to
Mexico by the low wages paid to local workers. The "giant sucking
sound," was the phrase used by Ross Perot to describe the catastrophic
phenomenon of companies and jobs moving to Mexico as though they
were being sucked into a black hole. This metaphor represented the main
force binding together this unusual coalition.
The Administration attacked the jobs issue with an equally forceful
opposing argument. It promoted NAFTA as a job producing agreement.
Thus, the ensuing battle of statistics with respect to prospective job losses
or gains caused confusion, radically divided public opinion, and probably
overemphasized the issue.20 As a result, relations between the White
House and organized labor deteriorated, and the labor groups defined all
those not with them as against them. Nevertheless, President Clinton
trusted that despite this confrontation, unions were not likely to abandon
the rest of his legislative agenda.2
The academic world had a mostly positive view of NAFTA.
Considering the acute difference between the American and the Mexican
economies, the overall impact was expected to be minimal, but positive.22
19. Krugman, supra note 16, at 16 ("The question is whether factories emerging from
NAFTA will do more damage than the factories in which Mexican workers would otherwise have
been employed."); see also William A. Orme, Jr., The NAFTA Debate-Myths Versus Facts: The
Whole Truth about the Half-Truths, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 2, 8. There were two
reasons to think NAFTA would be good for the environment: (a) the United States had made the
environment a top priority; and (b) industry was relocated to the North of the country, rather than
to the already unhealthy central valley of Mexico City. Id.
20. See Public Perception Regarding Jobs and NAFTA chart infra p. 448 which provides
an example of the differing results from one inquiry to another.
21. On November 7, 1993, President Clinton accused American labor unions of using
'roughshod muscle-bound tactics" to intimidate legislators such as threatening to retire support
for their re-election if they voted for NAFTA. NAFTA: The Showdown, supra note 8; Viva
NAFTA, supra note 8; CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3014, 3017 (1993); Congress OKs North
American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 173. Unions still contribute an average of one third of the
campaign funds for Democratic congressmen. At the root of the NAFTA debate "was a battle
about sovereign democratic lines . . . . [Tihe lines were drawn between progressive coalitions
anchored in labor, against the Fortune 500 represented by the White House." Land of the Free-
For-All, supra note 18, at 39.
22. The Mexican Gross National Product represents less than 4% of the United States
GDP. Other numbers, used to further this argument, view Mexico as the new addition to the
existing free trade agreement between Canada and the United States, but Mexico's economy is
just five percent of those of Canada and the United States combined. NAFTA could hardly add
much more than 0.1 % to the real income of the United States. Regarding job losses, the overall
figures were hardly above the 200,000 monthly average displacement rate of the United States
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The liberalization and closer relationship between the two countries could
help specific areas of concern, such as those regarding the Mexican
environment, wages, democracy, and immigration. At least, the
agreement would not make these issues worse. One interesting approach
promoted enactment of NAFTA as a matter of foreign policy rather than of
economics.23  A congressional member, advancing this trend, even
compared the opportunity to approve NAFTA with the historic opportunity
to purchase Louisiana or Alaska.24
In the midst of the debate, many other topics were addressed, such
as human rights, drug dealing in Mexico, United States' sovereignty,
supranational bureaucracies, the uneven playing field in trade,
immigration, and the deficit increase. Many specific examples of midsize
companies threatened by the unfair competition, with Mexico, or highly
benefited by the already opening Mexican market, were offered. The final
debate was between two groups that, according to some analysts,
possessed competing domestic agendas and irreconcilable world views.' 5
Nevertheless, the debate was to be resolved by a third group of undecided
voters. Pushed by the Administration, this undecided group found itself
trapped in a war of extremist assertions. Its decision required a leap of
faith and personal sensitivity. Many of those who were undecided were
economy. According to union sponsored research, only 96,000 jobs had shifted to Mexico over
the last 15 years. Considering the average level of tariffs of the United States towards Mexico
were already at four percent, no dramatic change was expected in that area. On the other hand,
the benefits of the accord would flow out from the principle of free trade, scale economies, and
globalization. As a result, in the three countries, employment would increase in some industries
and would fall in others; but, the final result would be positive. Krugman, supra note 16, at 13;
Orme, supra note 19, at 2; Glasmeir et al., Tequila Sunset? NAFTA and the US Apparel
Industry, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 36; NAFTA: The Showdown, supra note 8, at 23; Eat
Your NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 15-16. For an approach questioning the
globalization-free trade view, see Thomas I. Palley, The Free Trade Debate: A Left Keynesian
Gaze, 61 SOC. RES. 379 (1994).
23. The accord was viewed as tying up the Mexican economic reform, and as an
indubitable signal from the so-called "Latin American emerging markets" whose main partner, if
market reforms continued, was to be found in the United States. In the post-cold war, multi-
polar, multi-level international society, the United States faced the strengthening of the European
Union and the Pacific rim. It thus was sensible for the United States to take the first steps in
securing Latin America as a market area. Furthermore, considering the United States efforts to
push forward the world's multilateral liberalization trend through GATT's Uruguay Round,
approval of NAFTA was a congruent example of its commitment. See Krugman, supra note 16;
Orme, supra note 19, at 8; Abraham F. Lowenthal, Latin America: Ready for Partnership?,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 74.
24. 139 CONG. REC. H9890 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
25. Orme, supra note 19, at 2.
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torn by the congressional dilemma, balancing local concerns with national
interests.26
III. THE ROAD TO CONGRESS
In 1990, the government of Mexico approached the government of
the United States with the idea of negotiating a free trade agreement.
Since 1985, with its accession to the GATT system, Mexico began to
liberalize and to open its economy. The process proved profitable to states
such as Texas, which in turn encouraged then President George Bush to
initiate talks.2 7 By 1991, opposition to the agreement was already
organized as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and several environmental groups focused on
achieving the defeat of a congressional revival of the "fast-track
authority." Nevertheless,. Congress approved it in May 1991.' In
November 1992, Bill Clinton defeated President Bush in the presidential
election. Although NAFTA negotiations were completed before the 1992
election,29 then candidate Clinton had endorsed the accord by promising to
pursue supplemental agreements to address the deficiencies in the
negotiated text in the areas of the environment, labor, and safeguards.30
Clinton was apparently trying to appease two major interest groups which
supported his campaign: labor and environmentalists. The carefully
negotiated side agreements, however, proved to be unappeasing.
On August 13, 1993, marking the completion of negotiation of the
supplemental side agreements, House Majority Leader Gephardt
announced he could not support the accord as it stood.3' Previously,
Gephardt had suggested that Clinton should not support the Bush text
because it contained no protections for the enforcement of Mexican
workers rights, nor any mechanism that assured wages in Mexico rise
26. For a detailed analysis of the concept of two Congresses, see ROGER H. DAVIDSON &
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS (1994).
27. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3180.
28. 'Fast Track' Trade Procedures Extended, XLVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 118 (1991).
29. President Bush initialed the pact on August 12 of that year. Initialing the pact was a
formal requirement under the "fast-track authority." With that act, Bush expressed his intent to
sign the accord. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 173.
30. Then Governor Clinton defined his position in an address at the Student Center of the
North Carolina State University campus in Raleigh on October 4, 1992. Luis Miguel Diaz, The
NAFTA Tri-Lateral Commissions on the Environment and Labor, 2 U.S.-MEXICAN L.J. 13
(1994).
31. Gephardt is a leader of the labor cause in the House. See Viva NAFTA, supra note 8,
at 21.
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along with productivity.32 On September 21, in a speech at the National
Press Club, Gephardt confirmed that he would vote against the pact. With
this news, the formerly unified Democrat leadership was divided on the
passage of NAFTA. Aside from Representative Gephardt, the second
highest ranked Democrat in the House, Majority Whip David Bonior,3
also opposed the pact. One month before, Bonior collected 100
commitments from Democrat Representatives to demand NAFTA be
delayed until healthcare reform was passed. 34 Despite widespread support,
this action did not prosper. However, Representative Bonior continued to
work hard for the defeat of the pact. In October, he announced he was
only nine votes away from the 218 needed to kill the agreement. 35  Thus,
the leadership role of the pro-NAFTA Democrats fell to House Speaker
Thomas S. Foley.36 The split in the leadership showed the vote was not
going to be based on loyalty, but on conscience. Partisan affiliation,
therefore, was not a reliable variable for predicting the result. President
Clinton had not yet begun working strongly for NAFTA passage when his
opponents, especially Ross Perot, took advantage of the White House
Administration's slow start to try to capture the public conscience.37
32. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 177.
33. Representative Bonior is an interesting case of the representative-constituency
relationship. Bonior represents a district in Michigan that encompasses the city of Macomb. His
opposition to NAFTA was greeted enthusiastically there; even his last Republican challenger
opposed the pact. A large part of his constituents still remember the 1981-82 recession, when the
Big Three (Ford, Chrysler, and GM) reduced the Macomb workforce by half. Furthermore, the
small and midsize business community believes the future lies in productivity associated with
nearby markets. The community does not understand why the government would tempt the car
industry to move to Mexico. Representative Bonior also has personal reasons to oppose the pact.
Representative Bonior believes the pact to be an extension of the United States colonialist policy
toward Latin America, furthered by a conspiracy of corporate and academic elitists.
Representative Bonior has voted for higher taxes, higher spending, and lifting of the Cuban
embargo. He voted against the Gulf War. Any of the items on that list would probably have
been sufficient to eject any other member from Congress, but Representative Bonior's relation to
his constituents is symbiotic. Representative Bonior worked for the Detroit car plants and shares
Polish-American roots with a large part of his supporters. His Catholic sense of justice and his
ability to outspend his opponents five to one have also been key elements contributing to his
permanence in the House. Free Trade, the Vast Middle and David Bonior, ECONOMIST, Sept.
18, 1993, at 36.
34. Viva NAFTA, supra note 8, at 22.
35. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 178.
36. Representative Bill Richardson functioned as the Democrats' Whip for passage of
NAFTA, and together with Representative Matsui coordinated the party. The Flying Arkansan,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1993, at 25; Cloud, supra note 9, at 3014.
37. President Clinton had been immersed in budget battles and, to avoid offending anti-
NAFTA Democrats, he had been careful not to raise the issue throughout the negotiations on the
side agreements. Marketing NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 14 (noting that the treaty
faced a fight in Congress).
Posadas
September 14, 1993, with the signing of the Environment and
Labor Side Agreements, was the date chosen by the President to launch a
campaign for approval of NAFTA. He designated lawyer William W.
Daley as special advocate for the NAFTA cause.3" President Clinton
delivered a speech that made George Bush comment, "[n]ow I know why I
am outside looking in and he is inside looking out."3 9 Soon after,
corporate America got on the road through an alliance of 2700 companies,
including most of the Fortune 500, to lobby for the agreement. The
alliance, under the name of USA NAFTA, chose Lee Iacocca as its
champion. The business community prepared for a short, fierce fight.'
On September 24, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed a lower court decision that required
NAFTA to be submitted to an environmental impact study, thus clearing
the last obstacle to a congressional vote .4' Finally, on November 3, the
President sent the implementing NAFTA bill to Congress.
IV. THE HOUSE, THE COMMITTEES, AND THE DEALS
According to a media specialist, "NAFTA is a tough challenge for
the art of congressional arm twisting. Proponents are trying to sell a
policy with global economic implications to lawmakers for whom all
politics are local.' 42
Before the President sent the implementing bill to Congress, a
peculiar practice had already occurred, the drafting of mock
implementation bills. This practice was a response to the nature of the
agreement. Negotiated under fast-track authority, the NAFTA bill could
not be modified once submitted to Congress. Neither the bill of
implementation, nor the text negotiated by the countries, which was
included in the former, were subject to modification. The mock bills were
38. Daley, brother of the Mayor of Chicago, was named campaign coordinator for
NAFTA, and was given the privileged "War Room" in the Old Executive Office Building next
door to the White House. He was responsible for heading the White House lobbying efforts in
Congress. Waking up to NAFTA, supra note 9, at 27.
39. Id. In his speech, President Clinton called on Americans to embrace change and to
"create the jobs of tomorrow," rather than seeking to preserve "the economic structures of
yesterday." Id. at 27.
40. USA NAFTA sponsored 60-second televised advertisements which began airing on
October 10, 1993, tailored to combat Perot's anti-NAFTA propaganda. Businessmen for NAFTA,
supra note 11, at 27.
41. The court of appeals held that the President's actions are not agency action, and
therefore are not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
42. CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., supra note 21, at 3014.
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drafts prepared by congressional committees working on the implementing
bill. The President had absolute discretion in deciding whether or not to
consider the mock bills' in preparing his own bill. Nevertheless, if he
wanted a positive result he could not simply disregard them. The mock
draft exercise was a first step in the Congress-White House negotiating and
lobbying process.43
Once in Congress, the bill went through committee consideration.
Adhering to the rationale of the mock drafts, this consideration was pro-
forma only." Before voting on NAFTA, Congress had conducted eighty-
eight hearings beginning in June 19 1990, issued six reports beginning in
September 1992, and conducted three NAFTA debates. 45 Because of the
thoroughness of the process, it would be difficult to imagine that a member
casted an uninformed vote.
One of the most criticized aspects of the approval process were the
deals the Administration made to win over undecided members. NAFTA
contains additional side agreements other than the well-known agreements
covering environmental and labor issues. These concessions presented an
interesting international political compromise among Mexico, Canada, and
the White House to fulfill some congressional members' expectations and
conditions. Thus, the Administration extracted a commitment from
Mexico not to export sugar indefinitely, and to begin negotiations after
NAFTA's passage for the acceleration of the phasing out tariffs in for flat
glass, wine, appliances, and bedding.46 In exchange, the White House
agreed to reinstate tariffs for oranges and tomatoes in case they overflowed
the American market, to finalize last minute deals protecting peanut
growers and wine producers in California, and to extract concessions from
43. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee were
responsible for conducting the mock or shadow markups of the NAFTA. For example, on
September 30, the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee approved a draft version of the bill.
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Oct. 2, 1993, at 2620, 2621; see also Congress OKs North American
Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 171.
44. In the House, the Ways and Means Committee approved NAFTA on November 9,
1993, by a vote of 29 to 12; the Energy and Commerce Committee sent it to the floor without
recommendation; and the same day, the Banking Committee sent the bill to the floor
accompanied with an unfavorable recommendation. Land of the Free-For-All, supra note 18.
45. Of the 88 hearings, 64 were conducted by House committees. The hearings ranged
from issues such as environment, labor, and settlement of disputes to human rights, democracy,
elections, and the peso devaluation in Mexico. Congress also conducted fourteen related hearings
and issued seven related reports. Congressional Information Services, 93-P.L. 103-182.
46. The sugar deal was made to assure the support of Louisiana lawmakers. Sugar
producers feared that Mexico would substitute corn sweeteners in products for its local markets
and export its sugar surplus. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 178.
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Canada regarding American wheat farmers near the Canadian border.47
Representative Clay Shaw Jr., a Republican from Florida, saw an
opportunity to condition his vote on a promise from Mexico to extradite an
alleged rapist.48
Even non-NAFTA countries were affected by the deals. For
example, the White House reinstated the phasing out of textile tariffs from
ten to fifteen years, which applied to the Philippines and other developing
countries.49 The Hispanic caucus, led by Representative Esteban E.
Torres, a Democrat from California, pushed for the allocation of one
billion dollars to public works projects for communities that would lose
jobs to Mexico.5 Other members of Congress worked out their own
deals. For example, Representative Floyd H. Flake, a Democrat from
New York, after announcing his support for NAFTA, received a call from
President Clinton informing him of a Small Business Administration pilot
program that had been allocated to his district in Queens, New York.5
Many of the deals were formalized through letters of
understanding, but others were the product of unwritten political
compromises.52 Anti-NAFTA groups attacked this give-away procedure
vociferously. Regardless of what position they took on the deals, the
defenders of the deal-making process explained that the deals were
substitutes for the amendment process which was foreclosed because of the
fast-track rules for the adoption of NAFTA. The White House also was
restricted as to the extent of the concessions which were granted. For
example, the Administration rejected a tax cut on cigarettes sought by
47. The Administration designed a mechanism for re-imposing tariffs on Mexico if the
price of orange juice concentrate as tracked on the New York Commodities Exchange dropped
down to a certain level. With the agreement on oranges and tomatoes, the Administration won
the votes of the nine representatives from Florida. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3179; Congress OKs
North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 178; The Flying Arkansan, supra note 36, at 25.
48. The accused was charged of having raped a five-year-old girl. Mexico's practice
regarding extradition is not to extradite Mexican nationals but to judge them under its own laws.
Clay wanted the accused to be judged in the United States, where the act was committed. CONG.
Q. WKLY REP., Oct. 2, 1993, at 2620; CONG. Q. WKLY REP., Nov. 13, 1993, at 3106.
49. This decision included 10 votes of House members from textile producing districts.
Cloud, supra note 9, at 3175.
50. The North American Development Bank (NAD Bank) addressed this concern; only
Representative Torres from the Hispanic caucus voted for NAFTA. Although the NAD Bank
was not the only one to tackle this concern, some critics sarcastically adopted the phrase: "one
bank, one vote." Cloud, supra note 9, at 3175; David S. Cloud, Clinton Turns Up Volume on
NAFTA Sales Pitch, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2863, 2863 (1993); The Great NAFTA Bazaar,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 27.
51. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 179.
52. See 139 CONG. REC. H9883 (letters of understanding).
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representatives from North Carolina.53  Furthermore, the active
participation of Mexico and Canada in lobbying the United States
Congress evidenced a concerted effort to stay within the well marked
boundaries of the political process.'
V. THE VOTE
The process of gaining votes for passage of NAFTA resembled
climbing a mountain, a race to the top against the clock.55 Somber, or
deeply doubtful, remarks were not uncommon throughout the process.
"Being for NAFTA right now is like being for a congressional pay raise,"
declared Representative Fred Upton, a Republican from Michigan, in early
November 1993; Representative Dale E. Kildee, a Democrat from
Michigan, pointed out the undecided "want to cast their vote quietly;" and
Representative Richard A. Gephardt, the Democrat from Missouri, said he
had never seen such intense pressure on members for a positive vote.56
On November 9, 1993, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen,
unofficially declared that the Administration was twenty-six members short
of the required 218 votes to obtain House approval for NAFTA.57 More
detailed analysis that week showed 175 members favoring the accord,
fourteen were classified as "leaning" towards approval, and thirty-two
were undecided.5" Many Republicans favored the agreement but were not
willing to let the White House rely on them for support. Republican
Minority Whip, Newt Gingrich, made it clear that a bipartisan effort was
necessary to obtain congressional approval of NAFTA.59
53. The tax on cigarettes was a powerful arm of the upcoming healthcare reform effort; the
Administration was not willing to endanger it. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3179.
54. During the November 17th House debate, a member affirmed according to a study
conducted by the Center for Public Integrity, Mexico had spent at least 30 million dollars in
lobbying the United States Congress (no confirmation of this data could be found by the author).
See 139 CONG. REC. H9900 (statement by Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, R-NY).
55. On August 21, 1993, it was estimated the vote in the Senate was in favor of NAFTA,
but in the House the numbers showed only 120 of the 176 Republicans were in favor; only 1/3 of
the Democrats were then in favor, 1/3 opposed it, and 1/3 were undecided. Large delegations,
such as California and Florida, opposed the agreement. Viva NAFTA, supra note 8, at 22.
56. Cloud, supra note 14, at 3104.
57. This remark was made before the Gore-Perot debate on NAFTA. The Great NAFTA
Bazaar, supra note 50, at 27.
58. According to this analysis, of the 175 favoring the accord: 100 were Republicans and
75 were Democrats, 14 "leaning" members were Democrats, and 15 of the undecided were
Republicans, the remaining 17 being Democrats. Cloud, supra note 14, at 3107.
59. Representative Gingrich feared too much reliance on Republicans would push
Democrats into taking a safe position not to risk any political capital. Some Republicans
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Although the Republican Party did not control the House of
Representatives, President Clinton owed more to the GOP members for his
victory in obtaining approval for NAFTA than to members of his own
party: 132 Republicans and 102 Democrats voted "aye." Democratic
members who received twenty percent or more of their total campaign
contributions from labor Political Action Committees (PACs) generally,
but not in all cases, voted against the agreement. 60 From the thirty House
members that identified themselves on November 12, 1993, as being
undecided, twenty-one voted in favor of NAFTA.6'
Another element of the victory was the public support for
NAFTA. Wisely, it was remarked that if President Clinton won the
support of the voters, he was going to win in Congress.62 Through the
final months preceding the vote, public opposition to NAFTA grew and
resulted in a small approval margin. 6' The relationship between the voters
and the representatives was reflected in the House decision.
Finally, Ross Perot's prediction of a second vote on NAFTA, by
those congressional members who were elected in the 1994 general
election, proved unfounded." Of the 234 members who voted for
NAFTA, 184 were re-elected, nearly 80%. The surveys regarding this
issue, the Republican agenda in the 1994 race, and the nature of mid-term
elections, strengthens this assumption.65
VI. CONCLUSION
Although NAFTA will achieve the complete liberalization of
ninety percent of the actual trade in goods and services among the
contracting parties, it is a gradual process planned to be completed, within
twenty years. Considering the safeguard measures, the accord can be
viewed as an instrument of industrial oriented policy which is close to
President Clinton's and other Democrats' economic philosophy. As such,
complained they were being asked to take the risk for the President's policy, while Democrats
were running for cover. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3179.
60. Jon Healey & Thomas H. Moore, Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA's
Approval, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3181, 3182 (1993) (stating that 77% voted no).
61. It is difficult to find a defined pattern. For example, Representative Sangmeister (D-
Ill), who received 40% of total campaign contributions from labor PACs, voted against NAFTA,
but Representative Thomas C. Sawyer (D-OH), who received 41%, voted yes.
62. Marketing NAFTA, supra note 37, at 14.
63. See Public Support for NAFTA chart infra p. 447 which provides figures on public
support for NAFTA.
64. Ross Perot warned that in case NAFTA was passed by the Congress, it was still going
to be subject to two other votes, the electoral responses of 1994 and 1996.
65. See Public Reaction to Congressmen if Voted for NAFTA chart infra p. 450.
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it not only offers another explanation of why the President enthusiastically
adopted it, but it also reflects the nature of determining winner and loser
nations under the terms of NAFTA. This feature was exploited by many
members to extract concessions for local producers that were not able to
make their way into NAFTA at the negotiation table. Although highly
criticized, this practice is influenced by the local accountability to which
representatives are subjected. When decisions are made, and the affected
agents are not able to advance their concerns, social frustration will result.
Here, the political process was at work, and although it was not perfect in
this case, it was able to advance all interests: the administration had
NAFTA, many groups received concessions, and representatives
strengthened ties to their constituents. The fight over NAFTA left no scars
and has now been forgotten, leaving Congress free to address other issues.
On the other hand, many of the opponents of NAFTA had
radically different views on the philosophy, principles, and commitments
which underlie the agreement. Why did their efforts fail to defeat
NAFTA? The answer to this question may lie in the economic situation of
the country, and in the globalization trend. All of these factors influenced
the positions of the voting public and the members of Congress who voted
for NAFTA. In the end, after hearing so many arguments, pro and con,
can it be denied public opinion guided the outcome? After all, Congress is
a mirror image of the American people. The NAFTA approval process
shows us politics at work and the influence of public concerns.
Finally, the capacity of the collegiate organization of Congress to
assess decisions containing profound foreign policy implications should be
questioned. Today, we see Senate Committees addressing the White
House response to the Mexican financial crisis. How much of that
response can trace its origin to the change that NAFTA represented in
United States' foreign policy toward Mexico and the Latin American
region? Whatever the answer to these questions may be, in the midst of
the human conditions which result because of NAFTA, there will always
be the temptation for nations to think that their decisions are better for
their interests than the decisions reached through NAFTA, and whatever
nation can benefit the most from the agreement will also be motivated into
doing less to disturb its terms.
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Public Support for NAFTA
September 19, 1993
Do you favor or oppose NAFTA?
Oppose not so strongly 15%
Favor strongly 16%
Favor not so strongly 17%
No answer 27%
Do not know 1%
Oppose strongly 24%
October 26, 1993
Do you favor or oppose NAFTA?
Opposition 33%
Not sure 4%.
No opinion 34%
In favor 29%
November 11, 1993
Do you favor or oppose NAFTA?
Opposition 39%
Not sure 20%
In favor 41%
December 14, 1993
Do you'think NAFTA is a step in the right/wrong direction?
Not Sure 14%
Right 53%
Wrong 33%
October 25, 1994
Do you think NAFTA is good/bad?
No opinion 19%
Good 50%
Bad 31%
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Public Perception Regarding Jobs and NAFTA
October 26, 1993
Do you believe some jobs will be lost but more will be created?
Agree 42%
Not sure 13%
Disagree 45%
November 9, 1993
Do you think NAFTA would result in more or fewer jobs?
More 50%
Same 3%
Fewer 38%
Don't know 9%
November 11, 1993
Do you think NAFTA is good/bad for Aterican workers?
Good 38%
Bad 51%
Not sure 11%
November 11, 1993
Do you think NAFTA will cause anyone in your household to lose their job?
No 77%
Yes 12%
Not sure 8%
No one works 3%
November 16, 1993
Do you think NAFTA will create jobs because Mexico will buy more U.S. imports, or will
cause the loss of jobs because low wages attract firms to Mexico?
Create 32%
No difference 5%
Loss 53%
Do not know 10%
March 21, 1994
Do you think NAFTA will help/hurt the overall job situation?
Hurt a little 14%
Hurt a lot 18%
Help a little 32%
Help a lot 20%
Do not know 15%
No effect 1%
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I Public Perception of NAFTA Issues
November 15, 1993
If NAFTA is passed, do you think immigration from Mexico into the U.S. would
go up, go down, or stay about the same?7
Go up 26%
Go down 18%
Stay about the same 50%
Not sure 6%
November 11, 1993
Do you think NAFTA will be mostly good or mostly bad for American
corporations?*Good 69%
Bad 20%
Not sure 11%
November 16, 1993
Do you consider the vote in Congress on NAFTA a crucial test of America's
leadership role in the world?***
Yes 55%
No 37%
Do not know 7%
** Yankelovich
Hart and Teeter
Gallop
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Public Reaction to Congressmen if Voted for NAFTA
October 26, 1993
Which candidate for Congress in 1994 elections would you support:
A) Supported president Clinton's economic program, health care program, and
NAFTA;
B) Opposed all of the latter
Candidate A 52%
Candidate B 39%
Depends on candidate 4%
Not sure 5%
November 15, 1993
If your member of Congress votes against NAFTA, would this opposition make
you more/less likely to vote for him in 1994?
No difference 60%
More likely 16%
Less *likely 13%
Not sure about vote 4%
Not sure 8%
November 16, 1993
If youi mernie of Cpgress votes will that make you more/less like
more/less likely to vote for him in 19941
No effect 60%
Less likely 21%
More likely 14%
Do not know 6%
October 10, 1994
If your candidate supported NAFTA, wil that make you more/less likely to
support him?
More likely 19%
Somewhat more likely 29%
Much less likely 18%
Somewhat less likely 19%
Not much difference I %1f
Not sure 19 %
Posadas
The President, Congress and NAFTA
December 26, 1993
How would you rate President Clinton's job in handling NAFTA?
Excellent 20%
Good 40%
Fair 22%
Poor 13%
Not sure 14%
December 26, 1993
How would you rate Congress' job in handling NAFTA?
Excellent 6%
Good 38%
Fair 36%
Poor 16%
Not sure 5%
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